All net proceeds from the sale of the book


Moments of Impact

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
Tom Wilson Presents:

MOMENTS OF IMPACT






























































In Memory of those we have lost Donation & Scholarship Info

Waldemar Klemens (Wally)



The Family of Waldemar Klemens have decided to set up a Scholarship in his name at Lakehead University, where Wally attended school. Klewit is working with the family and Lakehead University to set up the Scholarship in Wally's Memory. Account and Banking Information: TBD.

Ajay Cariappa



Ajay was a proud alumni of The University of New Brunswick, and as such, his family has decided to set up a Civil Engineering Scholarship at the University. Ajay loved the Fredericton area and made it his home in Canada. Account and Banking Information: TBD.

Kyle Adams



A native of New Brunswick, Kyle's Family has set up a memorial fund in his memory at Socila Bank: Kyle Adams Memorial Fund Account # 201640312487

Matt Sawchenko



Matt's Memory will live on with his girlfriend and their unborn child who is expected in Spring 2009.

Jerry Burns



Jerry is survived by his wife, Carrie and two children, Jessica 14, and Taylor 5.


MOMENTS OF IMPACT



TOM WILSON WITH STEPHEN QUESNELLE

Pressure







Bravery

versus

Courage





Risk Tolerance

Risk Tolerance

Ŧ

Hazard Recognition






Risk Tolerance Factors

- 1) Capability and Experience
- 2) Familiarity with Task
- 3) Seriousness of Outcome vs Likelihood
- 4) Voluntary Actions / Perception of Control
- 5) Personal Experience with an Outcome




Risk Tolerance Factors

- 6) Cost of Non-Compliance
- 7) Confidence in Equipment
- 8) Confidence in Protection & Rescue
- 9) Potential Profit or Gain from Actions
- 10) Role Models and Peers Accepting Risk



"Pacific Costal management had met with the pilot three times to discuss concerns they had with his decision-making. The last meeting, about three months before the accident, was held because management was concerned that he was completing trips in what other pilots deemed to be adverse wind and sea conditions. The company believed this behaviour was causing other pilots to feel pressured to fly in those conditions and was also influencing customer expectations. At least one fishing lodge owner favoured the accident pilot because he flew customers in and out when other Pacific Costal pilots would not because they felt the conditions were too risky."

(TSB report August 11, 2010 Page 5)



"The day before the accident [another] pilot...made a precautionary landing to wait out...[poor weather] conditions. That pilot subsequently observed a Pacific Costal Grumman Goose fly by...records show that the Grumman Goose was piloted by the accident pilot"


(TSB report August 11, 2010 Page 6)



[Previous Accident]. "On August 2008, a Pacific Costal Grumman Goose was in an accident...the aircraft had crashed into a mountainside and was destroyed. A post-crash fire occurred. Of the seven occupants, the pilot and four passengers were fatally injured."


"Following the 03 August 2008 accident, Pacific Costal initiated a risk analysis of its Visual Flight Rules operations. This risk analysis was not completed because of insufficient in-house skill in formal risk analysis methodologies."

(TSB report August 11, 2010 Pages 10,12)



"Beliefs, combined with competitive pressures and the difficulty of enforcement, lead to situations where some pilots and operators are willing to take risks by flying in marginal weather conditions. Left unchecked, these practices become accepted norms and are adopted by new pilots"

(TSB report August 11, 2010 Page 15)



"During his pre-flight briefing, the pilot advised the passengers that the flight would be conducted at low altitude and that, if they were concerned, they could deplane. This is not a normal part of the pre-flight briefing and indicated that the pilot was aware that the weather along the route was likely to be poor enough that, in order to maintain ground reference, the flight would have to be conducted at a lower altitude."

"The pilot's commitment to the decision to depart would have increased after boarding passengers, loading luggage and starting the engines"

(TSB report August 11, 2010 Pages 23, 24)

























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